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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY of 
REDDING PENNSYLVANIA and 
LARRY RICHARDS SILVER, Adminis-
trator of the Estate of LYNN 
RICHARDS SILVER, deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
EAGLE STAR INSURANCE COMPANY, 
LTD., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 
14800 
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine 
whether the deceased pilot, Lynn Richards Silver, was an 
omnibus insured under the Aircraft Hull & Liability Policy 
of Eagle Star Insurance Company. If Eagle Star Insurance 
Company's policy does not provide primary coverage, there is no 
dispute but that American Casualty's Umbrella Excess Third Party 
Liability Policy would provide coverage to Lynn Richards Silver, 
less a $10,000 retained limit (deductible). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon stipulated facts, both parties filed motions for 
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summary judgment and the trial court entered j~dgment in favor 
of respondents American Casualty Company and The Estate of Lynn 
Richards Silver. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment entered 
by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to the issues of this case are not 
in dispute and respondents accept appellant's statement thereof 
with the following additions and corrections: 
a) American Casualty's umbrella policy provides that 
it will indemnify the insured for loss in excess of the total 
applicable limits of the underlying insurance stated in the 
schedule, in excess of the insured's retained limit. The 
schedule of underlying insurance specifically lists coverage 
for "aircraft liability" through the underlying insurer, Eagle 
Star Insurance Company, in the sum of $1,000,000.00. 
b) Eagle Star's aircraft policy was written on the 
specific aircraft which crashed and gave rise to the claims 
which have been filed against the Estate of the deceased pilot, 
Lynn Richards Silver. 
c) When the aircraft was first acquired, there was 
some discussion of having C. W. Silver Company pay "remuneration 
to the Sileo Corporation for its use, in addition to its maintB 
- 2-
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ance and operation expenses. (Deposition of Roy R. Silver, 
p. 31-32). However, such a plan was never put into effect 
(Deposition of Roy R. Silver, p. 36, 42-43, & SO) and there is 
no record of any remuneration having been paid to Sileo Corpor-
ation for use of the aircraft on the fatal trip (Deposition of 
Roy R. Silver, p. 43). 
d) It is not admitted that the aircraft in question 
was never used for the business travel of Sileo Corporation. 
Mr. Larry R. Silver seemed to remember that the aircraft was 
used at least on one occasion by Sileo Corporation to take some 
people to Bear Lake to look at some property that Sileo Corpora-
tion was interested in buying (Deposition of Larry R. Silver, 
p. 34). 
ARGUMENT 
The only real issue in this case is What constitutes 
"remuneration"? If Sileo Corporation, the owner of the aircraft 
received remuneration for the flight in question, then the de-
ceased pilot was not insured under the appellant's policy; if 
it did not, then he was insured under appellant's policy. 
POINT I 
PAYMENT OF OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE EX-
PENSES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REMUNERATION 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF DEFENDA.~T'S POLICY 
It should be noted that this is ~ an action by Sileo 
Corporation against c. W. Silver Company to determine whether or 
not the former wo11ld have been entitled to remuneration from the 
- 3-
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latter for the use of its aircraft, but it is an action by an 
excess insurance carrier and its insured, which has a personal 
liability exposure in the amount of its retained limit of 
$10,000.00, against the primary insurance carrier to determine 
the validity of the latter's denial of coverage to the insured 
on the basis that the aircraft in question was being operated 
at the time of the accident under an agreement providing for 
"remuneration" for the use of the aircraft. 
Also, it should be noted that "remuneration" is not 
defined by defendant's policy and, therefore, the term should 
be construed consistent with its general meaning and as defined 
by legal authorities dealing with the term in similar actions. 
Webster' t New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged. 
Second Edition, defines remuneration as: 
"l. a remunerating; the act of paying an 
equivalent for services, loss, or 
sacrifices. 
2. the equivalent given for services, 
loss, or sufferings; that which 
remunerates; reward; pay; recompense; 
compensation." 
and Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines remuneration 
as "Reward; recompense; salary." 
The following authorities have considered the questi~ 
of whether remuneration means reimbursement for expenses, or 
only compensation over and above expenses. 
In Kaus v .. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 299 
N.W. 415 (Iowa 1941), it was held that the amounts collected by 
taxicab drivers over and above the cost of gasoline and a $3.00 
-4-
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d. 
per 12 hour period charge made by the cab company for use of the 
taxicabs was "remuneration" to the drivers. In this regard the 
court stated: 
Remuneration of an employee may consist of the 
difference between the price which he pays his 
employer for goods and the price at which he 
sells them, a percentage of the sale price of 
goods sold by the employee to customers and 
collected by him from them, and various other 
methods of collecting compensation from customers 
rather than directly from the employer. (Auth. 
cited.) The earnings of the drivers over and 
above the $3 and cost of the gasoline constitute 
the remuneration or wages for their services and 
it is not necessary that they be paid directly 
by appellee. 
In overruling a Public Service Commission order denying 
a petition to challenge the rates of a railway company, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Anchor Coal Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 15 S.E.Zd 406, gave the following 
guideline to the Commission: 
Remuneration should include a fair profit on 
the performance of any service, and compensation 
for any service should also include such profit, 
although, strictly speaking, it may have a nar-
rower meaning. 
Also, although not specifically differentiating between 
expenses and profits, the following authorities indicate profit 
for services rendered is an essential element of the term. 
"Wages" is defined as a compensation given to a 
hired person for his or her services; that for 
which one labors; stipulated payment for services 
performed. The word is synonymous with "hire," 
"reward," "stipend," "salary," "compensation," 
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"remuneration". Bevard v. Ford, 83 Mo.App. 498, 501. 
(Emphasis added). 
"Remuneration" is generally defined as a payment 
for services performed. Warner Co. v. Unemployment 
Compensation Bd. of Review, 153 A.2d 906, 911. 
Where services expended by laid-off employee on 
his family's farm during period of layoff, might 
result in future profits to him, such prospective 
profits were "remuneration". Muchant v. Unemployment 
Compensation Bd. of Review, 103 A.2d 438, 440. 
Money received by drivers of cabs owned by cab 
company was "remuneration" within wages definition 
of unemployment insurance law even though drivers 
were paid by customers and not by cab company. 
Blue Bird Cab Co. v. Maryland Dept. of Employment 
Sec., 248 A.2d 331, 334. 
In the instant case, Sileo Corporation received no 
remuneration from C. W. Silver Company since the latter merely 
paid the expenses of maintaining and operating the aircraft. 
Sileo Corpora ti on received no profit from C. W. Silver Company's 
use of the aircraft; and, specifically, received no payment froo 
C. W. Silver Company for its use of the aircraft in connection 
with the fatal flight. 
Appellant relies on the case of Melton v. Ranger 
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Insurance Co., 515 S.W.Zd 371, (Texas 1974) as supportive of 
its position. In that case, the insurance policy in question 
specifically exclu.:led from a definition of insured, "Any person 
operating the aircraft under the terms of any rental agreement 
or training program which provides any remuneration to the 
named insured for the use of said aircraft." In that case the 
insured had executed an express rental agreement for profit 
from Nelton. The court at page 372 stated: 
The facts in this case are undisputed. 
On May 2, 1969, Donald S. Melton entered into 
an aircraft rental agreement with the St. Louis 
Flying Service, Inc., whereby Melton for a fee 
payable to lessor, rented a Piper Cherokee air-
craft from St. Louis Flying Service, Inc. Later 
that day this aircraft ran out of gas and crashed, 
fatally injuring the pilot, Melton and 6 passengers. 
The court later stated at page 372 and 373: 
It was undisputed that at the time the 
involved crashed it was being operated 
t at rovided a remuneration to t e name insured, 
St. Louis Flying Service, Inc. Emp asis a 
That case is clearly distinguishable by its undisputed facts, 
to wit: That an express rental agreement for remuneration was 
made. So also are the cases of Jahrman v. Valley Air Park, Inc., 
333 So.2d 712 (La.App. 1976) and Buestad v. Ranger Insurance Co., 
551 P. 2d 1033 (Wash.App. 1976) cited by appellant. In these 
cases rental agreements for profit were clearly in effect. 
Respondent agrees that the "purpose of use" provisions 
of a policy should not be used to expand the omnibus insured 
clause; but it is hoped, and assumed, that the drafters of 
insurance policies in general, and Eagle Star's policy in 
- 7 -
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particular, would intend the two provisions to be consistent 
with each other. In that light, it is interesting to note 
that appellant's policy, under DEFINITIONS, paragraph VII, 
defines "Purpose of Use" as follows: 
(A) Pleasure and Business. 'The term Pleasure 
and Business' wherever used in this Policy is 
defined as personal, pleasure, family and business 
uses excluding any operation for which a charge is 
made. (Emphasis added). 
Just as the courts have held that "remuneration" re-
quires a profit or profit motive, so have they held the term 
"charge" requires a profit or profit motive. The Oregon Supreme 
Court in Cammack v. Avemco Insurance Company, SOS P.Zd 348 
(Oregon 1973), held that the payment of flight expenses for an 
airplane was not "any operation for which a charge is made" 
within a policy which excluded the same from coverage. In 
Cammack, the plaintiff's policy provided coverage for the use 
of the plane for business and pleasure but excluded "any opera· 
tion for which a charge is made," just as in the case at bar. 
The plaintiff permitted his uncle and cousin to fly the plane 
for $10.00 per flying hour. The court stated that the plain-
tiff "regarded the $10.00 per hour as helping defray the 
immediate costs of flying the airplane." The direct operating 
cost of using this plane was $ 7. 25 per hour, including gasoline. 
In addition no "tie-down" fee was charged the owner of the plane, 
but this was taken care of by the uncle who owned the airstrip. 
It was the uncle's friend, Rutledge, who was flying the plane 
when it crashed. And just as in the case at bar where Eagle 
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Star Insurance Company is attempting to avoid coverage by 
straining construction of their word "remuneration", the defen-
dant insurance company in Cammack, unsuccessfully attempted to 
avoid coverage by straining interpretation of the word "charge". 
The court found that the $10.00 per hour paid for the 
plane's use as well as the free storage of the plane was merely 
a "payment of expenses in a noncommercial context, and we agree 
with the trial court that Rutledge's use was not any operation 
for which a charge is made." 
In the present case, C. W. Silver Company paid only for 
the maintenance and operational expenses of the aircraft which 
was owned by its sister corporation, Sileo Corporatio~. And 
although an hourly rental rate had been discussed, it is clear 
from the depositions that such a plan was never put into effect. 
No profit above expenses was ever realized by Sileo Corporation 
for allowing C. W. Silver Company to use the plane. Therefore, 
the Cammack case is directly on point. A payment of expenses 
was not "an operation for which a charge is made". And, similar-
ly, a payment of expenses only is not "remuneration". 
The Oregon court further stated at page 350: 
This exclusionary clause appears similar to the 
exclusionary clause in automibile coverage which 
provides that the insurance does not apply 'while 
the owned automobile is rented or leased to others'. 
In Christianson v. State Farm Auto Insurance 52 
Hawaii 80 91 470 P.Zd 521, 527 (1970)the court 
interpret~d this clause, "On balance we think that 
the language of the policy ex~ludes covera¥e on~y 
where a rental is commercial 1n nature. V1sual1z-
ing a spectrum between simple permissive use (which 
- 9 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
clearly is covered under the policy), and commercial 
rent~l for a profit (which clearly is excluded), 
we view the present facts as being more in the 
nature of permissive use." 
In that case, the decision was that the payment of Sl0.00 a 
week by a friend for the use of the car for three weeks while 
the insured was gone did not constitute a "r.:c·nting". Other 
decisions to the same effect are cited at 7 ~ppleman Insurance 
Law and Practice, 453 Section 4436 (1962). Similarly, the 
instant case is one of permissive use and not a "commercial 
rental for profit" . 
. Uso, in Thompson v. E::::ell, 379 P.2d 983 (Wash. 1963) 
the Washington court dealt with an exclusionary clause reading: 
Excluding any operation or flight for which a 
charge is made (share expense flights shall not 
be considered as being made for a charge), dual 
or solo instruction (except instruction to the 
named assured) and rental to others. 
Ezzell was the insured. He and his wife and four 
Thompsons went on a trip for which it was estimated that about 
$400.00 as rental would have to be paid to the flight club whi~ 
owned the airplane. This included the cost of fuel. It was 
agreed Thompson would contribute $375. 00 to expenses which wouL 
include plane rental. The court affirmed a summary judgment 
against the insurer, holding the contribution by Thompson was a 
sharing of the expense, not the payment of a charge. The court 
stated: 
It is obvious that both a charge and share the 
expense result in the flow of some mo~et~ry con-
sideration to the recipient; yet one is insured 
under the policy of insurance while the other is 
excluded .... While undertaking to interpret 
-10-
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the provisions of the policy, it is incumbent 
upon us to observe the maxims of construction 
hereinbefore referred to; e.g. the construction 
most favorable to the insured must be apnlied .. 
Thus the distinction seems to be that in' a flight 
made for a char e the char e rovides the im etus 
or motivation for t e £11 ht; e. . ro it; while ' 
~ s are e~pense 11g t in icates a community 
interest in the flight, that is a common desire 
to make a particular flight. 
In applying Thompson to the case at bar, C. W. Silver 
Company's payment of expenses was not a charge which "motivated 
the flight". Furthermore, Sileo Corporation received no profit. 
As such no "charge" or "remuneration" was realized so as to ex-
elude Lynn Silver from coverage under Eagle Star's Hull and 
Aircraft Liability Policy. 
Additionally, in Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance 
Company v. Ivens, 338 F.Zd 452 (5th Cir. 1964), an exclusionary 
clause for "an operation for which a charge is made" was also 
involved. One Ulsch agreed to pay $10.00 an hour toward the 
cost of gasoline used on a six hour flight. Charter rates for 
the use of such a plane would be $38.00 per hour when chartered 
with a pilot. The court found that the $60.00 paid by Ulsch 
toward the cost of the gasoline was not a charge within the 
meaning of the policy, and therefore held the insurance company 
could not deny coverage under their policy. 
The only aviation case appellant cites which found a 
"charge" to have been made within the meaning of the exclusionary 
clause of their insurance policy was in the case of Pacific 
Indemnity Company v. Accell Delivery Service, Inc., 485 F.Zd 
1169 (5th Cir. 1973), and in that case, the assessment for the 
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-------~---:-.-:-=-:-=--------------------------· 
use of the airplane was $10. 00 "over and above" the cost of fu, 
and storage. Thus, it was clearly a rental for profit and the 
cou"t so found. 
Appellant's contention that the word "any" in some way 
enlarges or changes the meaning of the word "remuneration" is 
not well taken. As noted in the Cammack case, coverage was 
excluded for "any operation for which a charge is made," but 
the court did not find that the "operation" of the aircraft in 
question for $10.00 per hour was an "operation" for which a 
charge was made, even though the direct operating cost of the 
aircraft was $ 7. 25 per hour. The word "any" does not impart 
any special meaning to the words "operation", "charge" or 
"remuneration". It merely includes them, when they are other-
wise found to be present. The question still remains -- What 
is remuneration? And the authorities as noted herein have 
consistently held that it means receiving compensation over ano 
above expenses to the extent that a profit motive is involved. 
Whether or not the payment of expenses in the insta~ 
case would satisfy the Guest Statute is immaterial. That 
statute was designed to meet a different, specific social pro~ 
lem and has no relevance to the facts of this case. In the 
instant case, the payment of expenses was not made by the 
passengers to the pilot, they were paid by the Corporation whic 
employed both the pilot and the other male passenger. 
-12-
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POINT II. 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM "REMUNERATION" 
SHOULD BE IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE 
Respondents submit that the authorities cited under 
Point I above quite clearly indicate that the term "remuneration" 
means compensation which results in a net gain or profit to the 
one receiving it, as contrasted to merely the paying of expenses, 
but if there is any ambiguity in the term as used in the policy 
language in question, such ambiguity should be resolved in favor 
of a construction which provides for the coverage anticipated by 
the insured when the insurance was purchased. 
The rule applicable to contracts generally, a fortiori, 
insurance contracts is that doubtful language will be construed 
most strongly against the party who selected it. As stated in 
17 AM JUR Zd, Contracts, Section 276: 
It is fundamental that doubtful language in a 
contract should be interpreted most strongly 
against the party who has selected that language, 
especially where he seeks to use such language 
to defeat the contract or its operation, unless 
the use of such language in the contract is 
prescribed by law. Also, in the case of doubt 
or ambiguity a contract will be construed most 
strongly against the party who drew it or pre: 
pared it, or whose attorney drew or prepared it. 
Another form in which substantially the same rule 
is stated is that where doubt exists as to the 
construction of an instrument prepared by one 
party thereto or his attorney, upon the f~ith_of 
which the other party has incurred a~ obl~gation, 
that construction will be adopted which will be 
favorable to the latter. This rule finds its 
most frequent application in the case of insurance 
policies." 
and, as stated in 43 AM JUR Zd, Insurance, Section 271: 
The rule of applying the popular meaning to 
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insurance policy which are ambiguous, equivocal 
or uncertain as to the extent that the intentio~ 
of the parties is not clear and cannot be ascer-
tained clearly by ~he application of the ordinary 
rules of construction are to be construed strictly 
and most strongly against the insurer, and liberal~ 
in favor of the insured, so as to effect the domi-
nant purpose. of indemnity or payment to the insured. (Authority cited) 
This rule has long been recognized in Utah. In Richards v. 
-
Standard Accident Insurance Company, 58 Utah 622, 200 Pac. 101" 
(1921) the Utah Supreme Court in holding that sunstroke, althm 
scientifically a disease, is popularly ;.mderstood as an accidet 
and death resulting therefrom would come within the term of 
bodily injury by accidental means stated: 
The rule of applying the popular meaning to 
words found in insurance policies is doubly 
strengthened when the additional rules is 
invoked that insurance policies should be con-
strued liberally in favor of the insured and 
their beneficiaries so as to promote and not 
defeat the purpose of insurance. 
This rule was specifically followed in Moutzoukos v. Mutual 
Benefit Health and Accident Association, 69 Utah 309, 254 Pac. 
1005, (1927) and in Gibson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of the United States, 84 Utah 452, 36 P.2d 105, (1934). 
Although these cases are "old" cases, it is submitted that the 
courts generally have continued this liberal interpretation to 
the present time. 
In the instant case, if the deceased, Lynn Richards 
Silver, the general manager of Both Sileo Corporation and C. W. 
Silver Company, had not thought that his use of the aircraft by 
C. W. Silver Company was covered under Eagle Star's aircraft 
policy, such insurance would not have been listed in the sche~ 
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of underlying insurance in American Casualty's policy. 
Another principal of insurance law is that exclusionary 
clauses are strictly construed in favor of coverage. See 
Aschenbrenner v. U.S.F.&G. ,292 U.S. 80 (1934); New York Life v. 
Benyon, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir.~Utah 1946) and Pearl Assurance 
Company v. School District No. 1, 212 F.2d 778 (10th Cir.~Colo., 
1954). 
Also, it is recognized that the insurer has the burden 
of proving that an exclusionary clause of a policy is applicable. 
Hassing v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 108 Utah 
198, 159 P.2d 117 (1945). 
Although, the language in question, "operating the 
aircraft under the terms of any agreement which provides any 
remuneration for use of said aircraft" does not appear in the 
Exclusions portion of the policy, it is in effect an exclusion 
to "persons insured" under the Insuring Agreements portion of 
the policy, and since it excludes persons who would otherwise 
be additional insureds (since they are using the aircraft with 
the permission of the Named Insured), the language in question 
is of an exclusionary nature and the same rule should apply, 
i.e., that Eagle Star has the burden of proving not only the 
meaning of the clause if it is questionable, but that it is 
applicable under the facts of the case. 
All of the foregoing rules of construction are appli-
cable in this action since one of the plaintiffs is the 
administrator of the estate of the deceased pilot, Lynn Richards 
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Silver, who is an "insured" under defendant's aircraft policy, 
if the aircraft was not being operated for remuneration at t~ 
time of the accident. Said estate is a real party in interest 
to this declaratorv judgment action since if it is determined 
that there is no coverage under defendant's aircraft policy, ti 
estate will be personally liable for the first Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000.00) of claims arising out of the accident in 
question, that amount being the retained limit of American 
Casualty's umbrella policy. 
POINT III 
EAGLE STAR'S POLICY IS SPECIFIC INSURANCE 
A:'JD AFFORDS PRIMARY COVERAGE FOR THE CLAIMS 
MADE AGAINST THE ESTATE OF LYNN RICHARDS SILVER. 
Utah follows the general rule that a policy writtent 
cover a specific vehicle is primary as to any other liability 
insurance which may also afford coverage of the incident inw~ 
ing the vehicle. In National Farmer's Union Property and Cas~ 
Company v. Farmer's Insurance Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 
786 (1963), the defendant company insured the automobile invok 
in an accident and the plaintiff company insured the non-owner 
driver who had been using the automobile. The defendant co~~ 
refused to defend a negligence suit filed against the non-owner 
driver. The plaintiff company successfully defended the suit 
and then brought action for defense costs against defendant 
company. This Court stated: 
With regard to whether or not plaintiff is 
entitled to recover from defendant, by way of 
subrogation, the attorney's fees and court costs, 
the better reasoned cases would seem to support 
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pla~nt~ff's position. Both policies obligated 
plaintiff and defendant to defend the action 
brought by Wolfe. However, the defendant, being 
the primary insurance carrier, was the insurer 
ultimately liable.to pay a judgment against Morgan, 
had one been obtained, and therefore was obligated 
to defend him in the first instance. 
Also in Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157, 417 P.2d 
658 (1966) it was held that if two insurance policies cover a 
loss and one has a pro rata clause as to other collectible in-
surance and the other policy has an excess clause with respect 
to other collectible insurance, that the pro rata policy is 
considered primary coverage and the excess policy is considered 
an excess coverage only. It would seem, a fortiori, that where 
appellant's policy contains neither a pro rata or an excess 
cov2rag8 clause with respect to other insurance and respondent's 
policy is an excess coverage policy with respect to other in-
surance that is listed in its schedule of underlying insurance, 
appellant's policy should be deemed primary and respondent's 
policy should be deemed excess coverage only, as it is written. 
This Court has also considered the situation where 
one insurance policy provides specific coverage and another in-
surance policy provides blanket coverage which would also cover 
the same loss as the specific policy. In Prudential Federal v. 
St. Paul, 20 Utah 2d 95, 433 P.2d 602 (1967) this Court stated: 
The rule having wide acceptability pro~i~es t~a~ . 
where a blanket policy contains a provision limiting 
its liability to excess over speci~ic insuran~e? the 
blanket policy must respond, only if the specific 
fails to satisfy the loss. 
This is exactly the situation in the case at bar. 
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American Casualty's blanket umbrella policy admittedly covers 
the loss in question, but what said policy contains is excess 
to the underlying insurance listed for each specific risk. 
Eagle Star's policy specifically covers the aircraft in 
question. 
SUMMARY 
The sole question in this declaratory judgment acti~ 
is whether or not the aircraft in question was being operated 
under the terms of any agreement which provides any "remunerati1 
for use of said aircraft at the time of the accident in questior 
If it was not being so operated, then Eagle Star's aircraft 
policy provides primary coverage and American Casualty's policy 
provides only excess coverage in excess of Eagle Star's One 
Million Dollar limit and the insured's Ten Thousand Dollars 
retained limit. 
The record is clear that C. W. Silver Company never 
paid compensation to Sileo Corporation for use of the aircraft, 
other than paying the maintenance and operational expenses 
incurred in using the aircraft. Under the authorities cited hu 
in, such payment of maintenance and operational expenses does• 
constitute "remuneration" for use of the aircraft so as to remor 
the deceased pilot, Lynn Richards Silver, from the definition~ 
persons insured under appellant's aircraft policy at the time 
of the accident in question. 
-18-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
If under the undisputed facts of this case, there is 
any question as to whether or not such facts constitute "aper-
ating the aircraft under the terms of any agreement which 
provides any remuneration for use of said aircraft" and the 
court is not clearly convinced that they do, then construction 
of the exclusionary clause quoted should be resolved in favor of 
the respondents, since one of the respondents, the Estate of 
Lynn Richards Silver is an otherwise "insured" under the terms 
of appellant's aircraft policy and has a personal interest in 
said action due to the fact that if there is no coverage under 
appellant's aircraft policy, then said Estate is personally 
liable for the first Ten Thousand Dollars of claims made against 
it under the retained limit of respondent's umbrella clause. 
WHEREFORE, respondents pray that this Court affirm the 
judgment of the trial court and award respondents their costs 
incurred. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of March, 1977. 
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON 
~~ :-i~~i;N~ -~i65~b~rH _- -:i~. ~ )/. · · · · t.> --
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served t~o (2) copies of 
Respondent's Brief upon Glenn C. Hanni, Attorney for Appellant, 
604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 14th d~ 
of March, 1977. 
----.. ~· 
Attorney for Respondent 
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